. Many empirical studies on firm reputations have examined how the sudden release of information on (generally poor) quality performance affects the value of a firm, as measured by the stock market. For example, Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) and Barber and Darrough (1996) consider product recalls, Karpoff and Lott (1993) consumer fraud, and Mitchell and Maloney (1989) airplane crashes. Tirole (1996) introduced the term "collective reputation" in the economics literature and used it to study the persistence of corruption in groups of agents sharing a common name. The term is also used in the context of multiple firms sharing a common name (e.g., see Blair and Kaserman, 1994 , on franchising companies) or instances in which products are traced to groups of firms. Agricultural products, which are often pooled from multiple producers for the purpose of distribution or processing, offer an illustration of the latter, where quality is associated with the region of production.
1 Theoretical work in this area has focused on the public good nature of collective reputations and how free rider problems may be addressed (e.g., Winfree and McCluskey, 2005) . For many agricultural products, empirical research has quantified ceteris paribus the existence of price premia specific to certain production regions (e.g., Combris et al.
,1997, for French wines; Loureiro and McCluskey, 2000, for Galician veal; and Fotopoulos and Krystallis, 2003 , for Zagora Greek apples), demonstrating that consumers are indeed willing to pay premium prices for good reputations.
Perhaps because of this parallel evolution of the literature, the existence of a particular reputation structure is generally taken as an (exogenous) product or application-specific matter;
and it is not clear why economic agents form quality expectations on specific names for certain products, but use aggregate ones for others. Considering the cases in which firm and collective reputations coexist provides an opportunity to investigate the matter.
The automobile industry is a good example. Since each manufacturer usually has access to different technological resources and managerial skills, forming quality expectations on firm names is a sensible discerning criterion. Barber and Darrough (1996) find that, among the six major manufacturers operating in the US from 1973 to 1992, Toyota produced the most reliable vehicles, while Ford had the greatest number of product recalls. The study also shows that reputations are embedded in stock prices, and lack of product reliability hinders shareholders'
returns. At the same time, because Japanese and US firms operate in different business and cultural environments, we argue that consumers may also form more generic expectations on the quality of vehicles manufactured in the US versus those built in Japan. Indeed, Barber and Darrough (1996) state: "Japanese automakers have enjoyed a significant advantage over their
American counterparts in terms of vehicle reliability" 2 .
Such taxonomical structure of reputations needs not to be confined to the automobile industry, or to firm and country-of-origin names: whenever a number of names share a common, distinctive set of quality-influencing traits (real or perceived), nested reputations may arise. A comprehensive list of examples would be very large, spanning from Suisse banks to Bordeaux wines. Indeed, the only article (of which we are aware) accounting for the simultaneous existence of firm and collective reputations is a study on French wines by Landon and Smith (1998) . Even though the authors do not explicitly study the use of nested names to form quality expectations, they show that firm and collective reputations affect product prices more than current quality performance 3 .
While it is widely agreed that agents form quality expectations based on indicators of past performance (e.g., Shapiro, 1982 , Kreps and R. Wilson, 1982 , Milgrom and Roberts, 1982 , Diamond, 1989 , Tadelis, 1999 , Winfree and McCluskey, 2005 ; the exact relationship linking quality performance, reputation and (stock or product) prices is unknown. Empirical work, generally constrained by the nature and availability of data, adopted a variety of strategies, relating prices to the release of news on quality performance (Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985 , Barber and Darrough, 1996 , Karpoff and Lott, 1993 , Mitchell and Maloney, 1989 , latent reputation constructs (e.g., Quagrainie et al. 2003) or lagged quality ratings from consumer magazines (e.g.,
Landon and Smith 1998). In his concluding remarks, Shapiro (1982) asked: "How is the choice of product quality related to the information gathering activities of individual consumers or the information flows in the marketplace generally?" After three decades, the issue is not yet resolved.
The primary objective of this article is to study the economic rationale underlying the genesis of nested names and reputations. This objective is pursued by estimating, via quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978 ), a hedonic model of prices as a function of product attributes and the price premia associated to a three-tiered taxonomy of nested names. While ceteris paribus, name-specific price premia have been generally interpreted as direct measures of reputation, we note that such premia capture consumers' willingness to pay for a good reputations, net of the search cost necessary to associate quality expectations and names. This distinction is trivial when firm and collective reputations are studied in independently, but, as it will be shown, becomes pivotal for the case of nested names. A secondary objective of this study is investigating how multiple indicators of quality performance influence reputation price premia, thereby producing some results regarding how reputations can be managed.
The empirical application is the California wine industry, for the principal reason that blind quality ratings, exogenous to reputations, are available. While the wine market is used here as an application, we strive to "distill" a broadly applying set of results from the model, contributing to several fronts of the reputation literature. First, we address the economic implications of forming quality expectations on nested names. Second, we consider several indicators of past quality performance (average past quality, its consistency and name longevity)
to understand how firms and group of firms may manage reputations and obtain price premia.
Finally, by adopting a quantile regression approach, we obtain a series of snapshots portraying how the structure of reputation changes as product prices, and consumers' cost of "being wrong", increase.
I. The Model
Economists routinely use the hedonic framework (Rosen, 1974) to value product attributes that are not marketed directly. The approach is based on the premise that, in a market with perfect information and product differentiation, equilibrium prices will depend on differences in product attributes, ceteris paribus. The basic model is in the form , where is the price of product i, z i is a row vector of product attributes and is the hedonic function relating product prices and attributes. If we assume that a quality index exists and it is known to consumers, the model modifies to
where the presence of the quality index in the hedonic function may make certain product attributes redundant, while horizontal attributes relating to alternative uses of a product will maintain non-zero implicit prices.
We posit that, for experience goods, consumers approximate the unknown by using the quality expectations they associate to the (nested) names identifying a product. Assuming a three-tiered taxonomy conforming to the nature of our data, these will be the reputations associated with the name of the k th region of production, R k ; the reputation of the j th firm, r jk ; and i q that of a particular product b ijk (for wine this includes the specific vintage and variety of a bottle).
Introducing reputations and adding the time dimension by using the subscript t, we obtain . While the reputation of a particular product provides more relevant information than those of aggregate names, some individuals might have formed quality expectations only for the region names, and not for products or firms. Thus, it is legitimate to assume that equilibrium prices will depend on the reputation of all names, and not only the most specific ones. Adding a vector of parameters, β , and an i.i.d. stochastic error term, we can express the equilibrium hedonic price as:
Before proceeding, a further clarification is needed. When forming quality expectations, consumers face two important choices. First, they need to decide at what level(s) of name specificity they will collect information and form quality expectations. For example, an uninformed consumer may need to decide whether to focus on collecting information on alternative manufacturing countries, firms, product models, or all of them. This is the process we seek to model. After selecting the level(s) of specificity, sources of information (or an optimal mix of media) need to be chosen. Sources of quality information include direct experiences (personal or reported by others), expert reviews and advertisement. Each medium provides a different amount of trustworthy information, for a different search cost (in money and time), but we assume that in the long run consumers will form unbiased expectations. 4 Our next modeling step consists in specifying how reputations evolve over time, and what affects them. As it was argued earlier, the only consensus arising from the literature is that reputations depend on historical quality performance. Indeed, if quality is revealed after consumption, in a repeated-purchase scenario expectations will be based on information regarding present and past quality, 5 independently of the chosen medium. 6 Empirical research cited in this article generally related prices to location-type measures of quality performance. In dynamic models (Shapiro, 1982 and Winfree and McCluskey, 2005) , reputations have been represented as state variables whose current value increases or decreases based on the discrepancy between current average quality and past reputation. We adopt this general idea but, in addition to a location measure (the mean), we add two other dimensions to the determina reputation: quality consistency and the history of a name. The rationale is that risk-averse consumers should penalize names producing goods of inconsistent quality, and longevity in business may communicate high quality. Moreover, both factors directly relate to the search cost implied by forming quality expectations: inconsistent producers force consumers to search (at parity of "true" mean quality and the precision of its estimate), and so does a new name (existing reputations on older names only need to be updated). Formally, we assume that th reputation nts of more e of a name, say the k th region of production, evolves according to the following rocess: Jointly, equations (1) and (2) depict a model in which equilibrium prices are a stochastic function of multiple reputations and a vector of horizontal product attributes. In turn, reputatio evolve through time according to a deterministic process depending Quantile regression, a technique pioneered by Koenker and Bassett (1978) , provides a straightforward methodological strategy to examine if and how the reputation dynamics change as the cost of being wrong increases. Furthermore, the approach allows controlling for market segmentation and possible structural breaks in implicit prices of the attributes occurring acr price ranges (see Costanigro et al. 2007 ). In quantile regression, parameters estimates are obtained by solving the minimization problem: 
III. Data
The wine market provides a unique opportunity to analyze the relationship between prices, reputation and quality. First, blind quality assessments by experts, exogenous to prices, are available from specialized magazines. Second, wine characteristics that can be easily evaluated in-store (i.e., red or white wines, grape variety, bottle size and label) are relatively
homogeneous, yet wine prices span a wide range, suggesting that reputation effects play a r U.S. wines, identifies groups of wineries with similar weathe ine 7 prominent role.
Finally, multiple names are used to identify each wine, each with its own reputation.
While the winery name relates to the skills of its winemaker; the production region, the American Viticultural Area (AVA) fo r and "terroir" conditions, which exogenously influence the quality of the grapes and ultimately the wine (Wilson, 1998) . 
IV. Empirical specification
In order to estimate (3), equation (2) needs to be operationalized. We do so by specify  as a moving avera meas
1 2 : for a given winery, we expect the variance in quality across all the bottles of a specific wine to be small; and the rele our dataset and data constructs.
Assuming that the price effect of each reputation determinant is additively separable, the timated as vant name longevity effects are captured by the firm-level name. While most hedonic studies adopt log-linear specifications, here we allow the implicit prices of each regressor to change with the dependent variable by means of quantile regression, so that the imposition of a specific functional form is not necessary. Therefore, the dependent variable, price, is maintained in its linear f regarding the genesis of the use of nested name and it economic rationale.
For the median wine, reputation premia are increased by marginal changes in current quality scores (by $1.17), the firm average quality construct (by $1.34), and the AVA average quality construct (by $1.84). Conversely, a marginal increase in the standard deviation con reduces reputation premia (by -$0.29 for the firm and by $-0.85 for the AVA) 14 . From a producer's perspective, these results imply that, at parity of cost, policies aimed at increasing average quality and consistency should be preferred to the ones focusing on only one of the parameters. 15 More importantly, our results suggest that location is not the only parameter o quality density function relevant in determining reputations, as previous research generally assumed. The negative price effect of inconsistent quality is likely related to both consumers risk aversion, and the fact that variance in quality makes the task of for costly, eroding the premium associated with a name.
According to our estimates, the AVA premium of the median wine increases each year by an average of $0.29, implying that older AVAs fetch higher prices at parity of (present and pas quality. Surprisingly, the analogous result at the firm level of specificity is negative (-$0.03), which oddly implies that older firms capture lower reputation premia. Some reflections will help interpreting this result. As argued before, name longevity will affect price premia if consumers consolidate their quality expectations overtime: if a name has been consistently producing high quality for a long period of time, consumers may be willing to pay a higher price for an older name to avoid the hassle of collecting information on other, more recent names. On the other hand, if the historical performance of a name has not been satisfactory, consumer may stigmatize it and not care to update their expectations, even if real quality increases. We can expect this phenomenon to be more relevant when many alternative names are available (as for the case wine), and the cost of avoiding a particular name is low. The history of the California wine industry provides some reasons to believe that poor expectations have crystallized on the na of certain older Californian wineries (hence causing the negative estimate), while positive
The second layer of results is found by considering how reputation price premia change as names become more specific. For the median quantiles, the price effect associated with the quality of an individual bottle is smaller than the firm and AVA premia. In turn, AVA-level effects dominate all others in term of absolute magnitude. Indeed, the size and economic significance of collective reputations effect on the price of Californian wines is striking and in some ways paradoxical. If consumers value information, expectations consolidated on specific names should be valued more than the ones relative to generic names, ceteris paribus. The paradox vanishes if we consider that search costs curtail the ability of a name to capture all of consumers' willingness to pay for information on quality. These search costs obviously increase with the level of name specificity: as names become more specific in a nesting sequence, a larger number of quality expectations need to be formed and compared. 17 If these costs are large enough, a consumer will trade the increased accuracy of using specific name for the convenience offered by a more aggregated one. Indeed, the number of wines and winery names can be intimidating for many non-connoisseurs, and many consumers may prefer a simpler reference structure to compare products.
The last layer of interpretation resides in analyzing how estimates change from the lower to the higher quantiles. What can be seen by tracking this dimension in Figure 1 is an increase in the magnitude of the premia associated with the quality constructs for the firm and individual wine names, while AVA-specific estimates remain stable. From the 70 th quantile, the firm-level point estimates become larger than the AVA counterparts. The fact that reputation premia grow larger as wine prices increase is somewhat expected: the greater the monetary investment, the more consumers are willing to pay for information on quality to insure against bad experiences.
What is perhaps less obvious is the finding that, in relative terms, the price impact of reputation premia migrate from aggregate names to specific ones as prices increase. Our interpretation of this result relies once more on the role of search costs. While these are high for specific names and low for aggregated ones, price variations leave the cost of searching relatively unchanged.
Thus, most consumers may find it optimal to use aggregated names for inexpensive products, but at high prices they may be willing pay to search more and form quality expectations on more specific names. Following this reasoning, it is not necessary to invoke exogenous causes to explain why, for many low-priced agricultural products, firm level information is not available and reputations form only at aggregate levels: given a low cost of being wrong, consumers may just be unwilling to form the reference structure of quality expectations necessary to use firm names. Along the same lines, food contamination (e.g., E. coli) and animal disease outbreaks (e.g., Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or "mad cow" disease) represent interesting case studies in which the existing reputation structure is made inadequate and suboptimal by a sudden and unexpected variation in the cost of being wrong.
Returning to the estimates of Figure 1 , one may also expect that if a consumer forms quality expectation at the firm level, he or she will not consider at all the less accurate quality cues contained in collective names. Instead, we find that, rather than replacing them, for expensive wines firm reputation premia are "added" to the AVA premia, which remain stable across quantiles. This finding is consistent with a two-stage decision making process in which, when facing choices related to important consequences, consumers use the reputations of aggregate names as a sorting device to reduce the number of more specific names on which they collect additional information. Extending the inference outside of experience goods, a patient may decide where to perform knee surgery based on the reputation of a few alternative hospitals, but he/she may also collect information on the individual surgeons for more dangerous surgeries.
Such hierarchical structure of decision making would have important implications for those high quality firms which are trapped in collective names with poor reputations.
VI. Conclusions and Future Research
This article contributes to the literature on reputation in two principal ways. First, we modeled the hierarchical structure of names, laying the foundations of how to think about reputations for nested names. In an empirical application to the wine market, the article documents that reputation dynamics change across the price spectrum; and reputation premia migrate from collective to specific names as prices increase. These findings suggest that tradeoffs between the (negative) consequences of experiencing poor quality and the variable costs of forming quality expectations determine which names will develop reputations, and hence capture price premia in the market. This basic intuition, we believe, contains the seed for the formal development of a theory in which firm or collective reputations arise endogenously and, under certain conditions, jointly. Second, we presented empirical evidence that reputation premia are related to a series of factors summarizing the distribution of the quality performance of a name, and not only location measures. Here, we considered average quality, quality consistency and name longevity. The exact process describing how reputations evolve through time and the complete array of factors influencing them remains nevertheless an open question, as the specification of the adopted reputation constructs is a maintained assumption of the article, rather than a tested one. were well known dates from Egypt, cured ham from Gaul, oysters from Brindisi and marble from Carrara."
2 The study does not find evidence of spillover effects relating the quality performance of one firm to the stock market value of its competitors (located in the same or in another country). We suspect that this may be due to the short period of time (three-five days) over which stock market prices are monitored after a product recall.
3 Two equations are estimated: one predicting quality as a function of past (lagged) tasting scores (a proxy for firm reputation) and a set of indicator variables for the region of production (a control for collective reputation), and one predicting prices as a function of current quality, expected quality and a vector of wine attributes 4 Consumer magazines generally provide reliable information, yet a conscious effort to read them needs to be made, and sometimes subscription fees need to be paid. On the other hand, the information found in advertisement has almost zero cost, but its informational value may be dubious.
5 Note that information on present quality does not eliminate the necessity of forming expectations, as the possibility of purchasing a defective product in the next purchase remains. 6 We consider advertisement as one of the possible sources of information. We do not have the data to test whether advertisement influences quality expectations even after quality is revealed by consumption. In any case, we believe that wine advertisement in the United States was negligible in the time frame spanned by our data.
7 Wine Spectator includes the following in their description of the tasting process: "Bottles are coded and bagged, and all capsules and corks are removed…No information about the winery or the price of the wine is available to the tasters while they are tasting."
http://www.winespectator.com/Wine/Free/Wine_Ratings/About_Tastings/0,4634,Format,00.html 8 Certain AVAs in California are very large, overlapping or entirely including smaller ones. Generally, wine labels report only the smallest AVA name (and so does the Wine Spectator). In the few cases in which two AVA names were found, the name of the oldest AVA was used. 9 The first of each series is missing, and the second is calculated using the average quality score of the first year in which a winery appears in the dataset 10 The Wine Spectator publishes the rating of a particular bottle of wine only once.
11 Three hundred random draws were taken. See Hahn (1995) , and Buchinsky (1998) on the quantile regression bootstrap estimator of the variance-covariance matrix. conditional quantile models to transformed dependent variable conditional mean models is currently ongoing using multiple datasets. 15 For example, an AVA seeking to increase its reputation premium might enforce minimum quality standards on its constituents, or incentivize quality by instituting competitions in which wine tasting scores are made public. The first policy will increase mean and reduce variance (by cutting the lower tail of the quality distribution), while the second may have an effect on average quality, but not necessarily on variance 16 During the prohibition years, the California viticultural industry converted to table grape production (or grapes that "shipped well", for home fermentation). After the repeal of prohibition, wineries were forced to use such grapes in wine making, therefore producing low quality wines. Conversely, most AVA names were established during the 80's, when quality increased substantially and Californian wines could stand comparison with French products (see Taber, 2006) .
A concurring explanation is a confounding effect caused by economies of scale, as in our dataset older wineries have larger production capacity than new wineries. Goodhue et al. (2008) find that the wine industry exhibits economies of scale in production and marketing, because of the distributors' and retailers' preference for larger volumes. The median firm longevity in our dataset is 17 years. Wines produced by firms more recent than 17 years have a median production of 800 cases. The median production rises to 1,600 cases for firms older than 17 years.
